夫國有大難，海內同悲，救猶不及，而曰天譴者，非循儒以觀世也，仇共而已。此仇共之心，非關庶命，非關治平；國是日進，而仇心反增，蓋恨所仇者之不墜也。必翻聳人之論以貶之，貶之不足則諷之，諷之不足則稽古而戕賊之。若鞭屍者樂，得暢懷也。故曰天譴者，欲執鞭而已。其所以如此，一歸於妒。妒，忌也。
My Comments on the Olympic Motto posted in Civic China
標籤:
Y.T.
A second set of Comments posted at the same place: http://www.civicchina.com/?p=51, under the same name Bismarck. I have nothing against the Ideal of the Olympic Games, when it is interpreted generally and generously. Citius. Altius. Fortius. A philosophy of transcendence, if you will. And yet, when the O. Games become connected with so many other things - not only politics - one might begin to wonder, whether or not a bubble is in the making. An Olympic Bubble is no less a bubble; it is just olympic in size.
COMMENTS:
A little more contrarian thinking for the interested:
1. Having outlined my suggestions for a different way to lay out the facts, I am inclined to give some thought to the Olympic Games, the Olympic Motto, etc. etc. First comes the Motto.
2. The Motto did not exist in ancient times, as it is asserted by the bloggers here. It was only a product of the 19th century; and in particular, of a French Dominican. See the following:
THE OLYMPIC MOTTO
A friend of Baron Pierre de Coubertin, Father Henri Martin Didon, of the Dominican order, was principal of the Arcueil College, near Paris. An energetic teacher, he used the discipline of sport as a powerful educational tool.One day, following an inter-schools athletics meeting, he ended his speech with fine oratorical vigour, quoting the three words "Citius, Altius, Fortius" (faster, higher, stronger). Struck by the succinctness of this phrase, Baron Pierre de Coubertin made it the Olympic motto, pointing out that "Athletes need 'freedom of excess'. That is why we gave them this motto … a motto for people who dare to try to break records." This phrase, "Citius, Altius, Fortius" is the Olympic Motto. The Olympic Game is the international arena viewed by millions where the athlete's spirit, mind and body endeavour to excel and achieve the higher standard than the presently existing ones; thus fulfilling the Olympic Motto.
THE OLYMPIC CREED
Pierre de Coubertin got the idea for this phrase from a speech given by Bishop Ethelbert Talbot at a service for Olympic champions during the 1908 Olympic Games. The Olympic Creed reads: "The most important thing in the Olympic Games is not to win but to take part, just as the most important thing in life is not the triumph but the struggle. The essential thing is not to have conquered but to have fought well." The creed and motto are meant to spur the athletes to embrace the Olympic spirit and perform to the best of their abilities.
(Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/olympic-trivia/olympic-motto.html)
3. It might be true that Fr. Didon did mean "faster, higher, stronger," period. But when the saying was made the Olympic Motto by Baron de Coubertin, it was conceived in conjunction with the thought that "athletes need freedom of excess."
4. Looked at this way, with a little history in mind, the Olympic Spirit is, in fact, not something so peculiar at all: a venture capitalist in the Silicon Valley trying to crank out the most cutting-edge i-device may very well be said to be realizing the O. Spirit. Or an architect trying to erect a most spectacular tower in the middle of a desert. Or even a hedge-fund manager trying to out-perform the market. Why not? Faster. Higher. Stronger. The freedom of excess!
5. Many people, of course, do not want to take the O. Games this way, knowing very well nonetheless that today winning a gold medal takes more than the full power of a human being: You need state input; you need scientific research; you need all sorts of calculating and testing and shaping and moding. To host the O. Games successfully, you need international PR, commercial sponsorship, and, above all, some less-than-fully-honorable means to win the right to host them in the first place.
6. Yet, when we try to connect the O. Games with politics, we kindly neglect all these disturbing FACTS, but seek refuge in an allegedly ancient Motto. For we want to maintain a certain FANCY about the Games.
7. Now, when it is the state which tries to promote this fancy, critics would not hesitate to call it propaganda; but when it is the critics themselves who try to exploit the very same fancy, fancy is no longer fancy, but becomes an IDEAL.
8. There are many sorts of games in the world; but for inexplicable reasons the world is not inclined to take them in equally fantastic terms. Take the World Cup as an example. The world seems rarely so obsessed with the idealistic, and then political, dimension of this Game. Why? Isn't it world-wide enough? Isn't it sports? Isn't it a game that also demands "faster, higher, stronger"?
9. The O. Games have largely become a party. No longer the sports or the participants; but states, politics, architecture, commercial viability, media PR, NGOs, anti-terrorism, global civil society, protest, boycott, national pride, national coming out ... are now the major invitees to the gathering. What is this Thing really? Still a matter of "faster, higher, stronger"? Perhaps. But certainly not "faster, higher, stronger" in any innocent sense of the phrase.
10. So China is going to host a Great Party; and for this Great Party many people do harbor Great Expectations. It is likely to be successful, I believe; but in the case it be not, the decisive question, to be asked by many frustrated souls, would be, not how unsuccessful it was, but who caused its failure. If it be agreed by many within the PRC, that it was "they" who caused its failure, and "they" would rather likely be found, on that occasion, to be of an idealistic breed, the consequence could be disastrous. For then, no more a happy memory of "faster, higher, stronger," and some incidental talk of the O. Spirit; but an imperative, reissued in a yet more grudging way, to be "faster, higher, stronger" THAN THEY.
My Comments on the Tibet Crisis posted in Civic China
標籤:
Y.T.
I tried, under the pseudonym of Bismarck, to post a set of Comments in the blog Civic China: http://www.civicchina.com/?p=51. The bloggers have undertaken to collect a basic set of facts on the Tibet Crisis, which may form, in their opinion, a reasonable basis for dialogue among various parties and positions. An admirable effort indeed. But I am tempted, as a contrarian often is, to offer a slightly different perspective on these (and other omitted) facts. Hence my Comments. The version ensuing is a slight revision of the one I posted - revised chiefly for typograhical and stylistic reasons.
COMMENTS:
1. It is constructive to try to lay out a basic set of facts, whereon commentators should have reason to rely. But how the facts are laid out and elaborated upon, is itself not a neutral matter. Suppose, e.g., that a list be drawn up, where all publicly available eyewitness accounts and reporters' reports (including official ones) be documented; and that the ways be detailed, in which these accounts and reports have been used, or IGNORED, by each major medium. I am sure this exercise would paint a slightly different picture, as to what is at stake in the current War on Credibility at the international scale.
2. Many facts given in the list posted in this blog concern China, and how Chinese tend to think or mis-think. Wouldn't it be equally interesting - and constructive - to try to depict how people in many Western countries tend to think or mis-think, beyond the simple, and very trite, assertion, that the world hopes to see more human rights progress in the PRC? For instance, it wouldn't be too far-fetching to suggest, that many enthusiastic protesters in the West seem to follow quite routinely the FORMULAIC thought of "protest - crackdown," regardless of what really happened on the ground. The question - What would have you done, were you put in charge of the situation in Tibet? - is rarely put to this group, by itself or by others. Hark, and you would rarely hear the word ORDER or SECURITY uttered in this community; but only such words as VIOLENCE, CRACKDOWN, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. I think this is largely a fact, a fact that is as interesting to mention, as it is worth the studying: Through what lens indeed do these Westerners look at the world?
3. Perhaps we may further list, and investigate, the following fact: Is there a general DO-GOODER IMPULSE among these Western protesters, such that what they are really concerned about is not whether China as a country may progress in small but concrete steps, but whether a certain incident can give them yet another opportunity to vent their righteous anger at the rest of the world - it being this time the PRC?
4. Further down the road, we may even list, and investigate: What sort of picture of China have these Western protesters in mind, when they begin to make various assertions on the country? What indeed, does the phrase "communist China" conjure up in their imagination? What have they read, and heard, of the country, and in what ways have these readings and hearings affected their perception of it?
5. We should not touch on these topics too lightly, let alone omit them; for every misunderstanding must needs involve at least two parties, it being not obvious that it must be the one, rather than the other, that has contributed the greater part to it.
6. Your constructive attempt to list a basic set of facts for public commenting is very much to be recommended. At the end, it should help every reader to ask, hopefully also to answer, the question: What is to be done?
7. But that question should have been asked in the very first place, when riot broke out on March 14. Each and every protester in the West should have been asked this question. Many, I surmise, might have offered again the formulaic terms for an answer: Stop the violence; Respect human rights; etc. etc. But let's call this a FACT: Such formulaic terms as these could NEVER point to any concrete way to restore ORDER and SECURITY in a time of CRISIS. So the so-called answer would be no answer at all. We may put the question again: What, sir, is to be done, concretely?
8. We do NOT debase the dignity of human rights. It is an ideal that should guide the progress of China in many ways. And yet, it can also become the basis of the DO-GOODER IMPULSE of those, who need not confront the life and death of many citizens, innocent or not, in a MOMENT OF DECISION.
9. Not as a fact perhaps, but as a MAXIM, that the following ought to be proposed: No do-gooder impulse should be granted the moral high-ground, if he who has it refuses to contemplate the practical questions of order, of security, and of governance in critical times.
10. I have perhaps roamed a little away from the idea of collecting facts. But as I suggested at the outset, the laying out of facts is no neutral matter. Facts not only inform; they guide. And I believe that a slightly different structure is needed here, in order to guide the reader to ask certain questions which the present laying-out might not help him to. In sum, two things: (a) What sort of mind-set is driving Western perception of China, and where does it come from?(b) What action would have been taken, if a concerned commentator (protester included) were put in charge of the situation? With these two rubrics in mind, we may revisit the many facts listed in this post, as well as those that are yet to be collected and analyzed. Thank you.
Comments on an Article by Richard Spencer in the Telegraph
標籤:
Y.T.
Mr. Spencer's Article, entitled ""China is Blind to the Hostility It Can Arouse," published in the Telegraph on March 26, 2008, is available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/03/26/do2602.xml&posted=true&_requestid=258457. My Comments are posted under the name Bismarck.
I advanced a set of Comments on his Article, because it seems to typify certain modes of thinking that are scarecely examined in public discourses, whenever questions regarding human rights, protests, government reaction, and media reporting are raised. The notion of a "do-gooder impulse" is not proposed to vilify every attempt at defending the good; it is made to highlight, nonetheless, a certain moral dimension to the act, when doing good seems a very straightforward thing. - Bismarck, Mar.26, 08.
COMMENTS:
1. The Chinese people might not be very adroite in speaking the language of human rights - compared with Westerners well-versed in the art. But many in China, having access not only to the official version of things, but also to reports by certain media in the West, cannot fail to wonder, e.g., Why are the human rights of those 5 female workers burnt to death in Lhasa less worth the being made a subject of international concern, than the human rights of 15 monks said to be arrested by the Chinese Government, facing as they might torture etc.? Is it the case, that in the eye of such organizations as the Amnesty Internaitonal, people do not have the same human rights - lives are not equally deserving protection, and violent deaths not equally deserving condemnation - but these whose suffering seems to FIT certain Western perceptions of the rest of the world will be HIGHLY PUBLICIZED, while those whose suffering is not, will simply be GLOSSED OVER?
2. If so, then the DISCOURSE, not the ideal, of human rights becomes less than innocent. And in the present controversy - some call it a media war - it is THIS sort of selective reporting and publicizing, serving as it does to CONFIRM a certain image of China in many Western minds, that has irritated so many Chinese netizens.
3. It is imperative that such respectable writers as Mr. R. Spencer stop writing this way:"Since the protests began, many Chinese have turned on the Western media for misrepresenting the troubles. That is hardly surprising: at times of disaster, it is important to find someone to blame";as if all that Chinese netizens can do were to find scape-goats. This is as condescending as it is trivializing. Mr. Spencer must have, I dare say, hardly thought of saying that "it is hardly surprising that in such a crisis each and every Western medium would rush to vilify a communist regime, regardless of what has happened on the ground; for it is the West's perennial need to justify its DO-GOODER IMPULSE and righteous anger."Mr. Spencer would not write this way, because this is simply not part of his frame of mind. But why?
4. Mr. Spencer is not anti-China, as far as I can tell from this article. But the way he approaches the media war shows how easy it is, for a Western observer of China, tacitly to adopt, in a time of controversy, the mode of thinking quite dominant in many quarters in the West. This is no trivial matter. One might even do a thorough study on it.
5. The DO-GOODER IMPULSE is a very tempting thing. The image of Truth speaking to Power is, via textbooks and classroom discussions and public discourses, so ingrained in the mind of many Westerners, that they become very used to deploying that FRAME whenever something critical happens somewhere in the world. There are then always the good protesters and the bad government. How about mobs interrupting the otherwise good protest? Well, never mind: everything non-governmental is good, or near good, or, if bad, it must be excusable. Now, once you have this FRAME, it becomes trivially easy, and tremendously tempting, to take the next step: Support the good!
6. The 5 female workers in Lhasa had the bad fortune of not having died "in the name of" the good. They were innocent, to be lamented, etc., but just not that sort of good that would drive many Westerners to support the Chinese Government's measures. But why? Why is it so difficult to establish this psychological LINK? Well, I for one would say, that it has something to do with the human rights discourse ITSELF, however noble it otherwise must be.
7. The German girl holding a sign with the English words "China: Will You Shoot Me Too?" has probably never put herself in the position of the 5 female workers burnt alive, or of those who had been scared to death in the first 48 hours of the riot. Why not? Why is it so difficult for this German girl to think this way?
8. An article on these questions by Mr. Spencer would be most welcome.
安徒安裕安生--錄評近文若干篇
標籤:
Y.T.,
明日黃花
拙按：陳方安生勝選，以無民主則無民生，曾德成挑之於議事堂，不意蜂評遽起，過曾者多。十二月九日，明報載安徒安裕兩文，俱以過曾為旨。安徒之大論忽然，安裕之力嗟今古，雖多槐罵，未減龍雕。姑錄時鳴，用存言紀。又陳景輝借題援筆，槐罵及於彼所謂殖民之幽靈者，謬之甚焉，予乃辯之於後。蓋無民主則無民生之論，用高民主之聲價而已；鑑之乎史，其論固謬，質之乎發論者，則謬且誕耳。夫發論者苟不欲往績盡貶，則其功為證，雖時無民主，民生猶大可為也。人念港英，念民生之日進也。今所謂無民主則無民生者，當日持盾以為政，今日舉矛而為言；其言立，則其政一無可取，其政存，則其言所自必虛。虛也無他，忽然民主者，用高民主之聲價而已。安徒安裕固不鑑此，而陳景輝更無所及之，是無民主則無民生之論見愛於彼，雖忽然民主之人，此論既發，即屬同路，何忍其論受攻，其人受諷乎？怒而屬文，以保新譽。至若落地執沙云者，非干民主，安徒安裕無慮逞其才耳。
(1) 周日話題﹕旗幟鮮明 狠批忽然 文﹕安徒
人生如戲，政治亦如戲。政治即是戲劇這項隱喻，今天已非什麼真知灼見。但香港觀眾最不甘心的是，為什麼香港的政治演員，總是演不入戲，以至荒腔走板的鬧劇層出不窮。
再別說陳方安生參選之初，在遊行途中去恤髮，是拋不開當官心態和習慣，就連當上民政事務局局長的曾德成，也不鳴則已，一鳴驚人。上任幾個月，他究竟有沒有進入當一個特區政府局長的角色，還是以為寫自己的演辭，就是寫《大公報》社論？
當日曾蔭權換屆連任，名單中傳出有親中左派紅人曾德成，社會上沒有惹來太大反應。沒有什麼成見的香港人，亦準備拭目以待，不去搞擾這個「和諧社會」局面。
民主派的鄭經翰最近還撰文，為曾德成寫下一大串華美頌辭，並說他是「特區政府新官當中安全系數最高的一個，日後肯定可以扶搖直上，在建制內建一番功業。」(原文如此)
根據鄭經翰所說：「曾德成一向低調，作風正派，沉實堅定，原則性強，在個人道德品德和操守上，肯定不會予人可抓之辮子。」鄭經翰還說：「他是個典型中國傳統知識分子，律己以嚴，待人謙厚，自學成才，文學歷史修養，肯定是芸芸司局長中最高。作為知識分子，他官威最少，下班私人時間堅持不用司機……」
謙厚官威少的論斷
曾德成用不用司機，筆者無從得知，也不關心。然而證諸早兩日曾德成在立法會恭迎新任民選議員陳方安生的態度，曾德成「待人謙厚」、「官威最少」的論斷，就頗堪細味商榷。
曾德成身為民政局長，利用總結陳辭時段，回應議員們一輪實質無關痛癢的「社會企業」辯論，卻一口氣創造了一大串新詞妙句：「『官生』不是『民生』、『官生』不是『安生』、『忽然民主』外還有『忽然民生』」……管它通與不通，已收震懾人心之效，也使大眾領教了，香港《大公報》系統悉心栽培下自學成才者咄咄逼人的文風和修養，也讓人明白，曾德成是如何的「待人謙厚」。
不過，這段反唇相譏，言辭刻薄的精彩發言，含沙射影地招呼一個立法會新丁，除反映了左派對敗選如何焦躁不安，如何「輸不起」之外，究竟又是不是一種「官威」？
流氓革命建制風格
在英式文官制度約束下，香港人大概很少看見高級官員發威發惡(當然，中下級政府官員的官僚作風、傲慢冷漠，卻是常有經歷)，多見的反是官僚的油嘴滑舌、口是心非。曾德成這種時而怒目相視，時而搖頭晃腦的政治表演風格，對大部分香港人來說都是陌生的。以前從內地駐港官員的嘴臉中看過，反感之餘，籠統稱之為「大陸味」。
的確，把這種實質「仗勢凌人」的政治表演風格稱為「官威」並不太準確，因為人們往往在這種中式當官姿態中看到，與其說是官員精英欺壓平民百姓的氣焰，不如說是那分與宗廟殿堂莊重的氣氛格格不入的流氓味。
流氓會罵官，革命分子也罵官。有時流氓和革命分子之間，只有一線之隔。當革命分子一朝當官，流氓味和官味就產生奇妙的化學作用，在官威下透露出流氓本性和洗刷不掉的革命分子風格。所以共產黨人罵起官來，會似個激進革命分子，但他們之間互相批鬥，就活像一群流氓。所以，用有沒有「官威」來定義一個「流氓／革命分子／官」這種混合人種，其實沒有什麼認知意義。
曾德成被標籤為「根正苗紅」的左派，年少時定必心儀馬列，痛恨資本家，以前叫這種做「階級感情」。可是在香港，就算在內地極左當道的文革時期，反資其實都只是虛應故事。就算是工潮引發的六七暴動，事後也絕少給土共定性為「反資本主義」鬥爭。馬列信徒的階級感情，最終還是發泄在港英身上。
無論是「反資」還是「反殖」，這種「樸素」的「革命分子」感情，表面看起來和梁國雄那類反建制的街頭戰士，應該有兩分相像才對。可是，放在中國的脈絡底下，沒有人會把曾德成列入反建制一系。因為，與其說曾德成和《大公報》有一種反建制的風格，倒不如說，是一種混含了流氓、革命分子，和另一個強大官府靠山的「革命建制」風格。
忽然興起身分迷失
曾德成在聖保羅讀書時因參加暴動，派發傳單，被補入獄，對殖民政府自是恨之入骨，這個他從不否認。在羅湖邊界這一邊，他是個政治犯。但他自始之後，加入《大公報》，扶搖直上，官拜港區人大，卻是不折不扣的「紅色貴族」。是官是民？端視乎你從那一面看。
香港回歸十年，中央對一整代香港「紅色貴族」當年「愛國反殖」的舉措，卻是諱莫如深，既無評價，亦無悼念。一方面畜養他們成為名義的政治特權階層，一方面又不信任由他們來擔大旗，掌帥印。如今，只有曾德成一人，孤身在由當年殖民高官曾蔭權把持的特區政府底下，包圍在一大批「忽然愛國」者中間，恍如「無間道」的臥底。比筆者是他，也會產生身分迷失的錯覺，不知人間何世。
一九九七年之後，英人下旗歸國，從前殖民建制中人，紛紛分化走位，歷練自己的政治伎倆和良知耐力，把靈魂反複拿出來拷打、質問，無論結果傾左、傾右，都是希望「洗底」，以便「重新做人」。
事實上，二○○七年這場「兩太對決」，主調仍是前殖民地走卒的「洗底工程」，背景仍是身分迷失。不要說民主派中有人心不甘、情不願，就算是所謂建制陣營中，由吃過港英苦的阿伯，去為多年替英女王打工的葉劉拉票，又是怎樣一項難堪和尷尬，沒有阿爺壓下來是永遠辦不成的政治任務。
可是，「洗底」不是革命。革命是改朝換代，新時代和舊時代斷裂，一切從頭開始，除舊布新。「洗底」卻是一切依舊，只是易容扮裝，爭先變臉。
九十年代，香港的流行政治術語是「轉」，廿一世紀的流行政治術語是「忽然」。「轉」的比喻，還包含有一個軌，有一個載具，有一個方向。但「忽然」所指涉的，卻是來去無蹤，轉瞬生滅，沒有理由，無從解釋，要變就變。
此所以民主派史泰祖「忽然」支持葉劉，勞永樂「忽然」變街頭戰士，陳方安生「忽然」支持普選，葉劉淑儀「忽然」愛國……我們的媒體都不再用「轉」這個開始老化的形容詞。
香港的「洗底」競賽是如此急激，「新」分子和「舊」分子亦難以區分。反正「新」中有「舊」，「舊」中有「新」。但這樣來去無常的「忽然來」，「忽然去」，卻觸發社會上廣泛的神經衰弱和「忽然恐懼」症。
要幫助香港人克服這種新染的「忽然恐懼」流行病，政府應帶頭做好防疫工作。
只有洗底沒有反殖
如果曾德成局長真的(如鄭經翰所言)是「原則性強」，自己沒有「忽然」改宗，仍然如當日一樣，尊奉馬列，那他相信的應該仍是「革命」。要革港英殖民主義的命，就是翻天覆地，改朝換代，把港英餘下腐敗的殖民地體制，打個稀巴爛。
曾德成當日在《大公報》社，苦修自學，鑽研梁效、石一歌、丁學雷、羅思鼎等化名的文化大革命批判班子，學習他們那些洋洋灑灑、文辭火辣、瑰麗誘人的文章。在這班精神導師身上，汲取他們當文化打手的尖刻修辭術之餘，想定必也認同，真正的革命，一定要除舊布新，不容含糊吞吐，因為不破不立。
殖民社會是「民不安生」、「民不聊生」的舊社會，那洗脫殖民地恥辱回歸之後，一定要把香港建成一個鶯歌燕的艷陽天。「舊社會把人變成鬼，新社會把鬼變成人」。不把舊社會打倒，回歸又有啥意思？
正因為這點令人敬佩的革命分子文化基因，在曾班子云云眾高官當中，亦只有德成局長可以「忽然」跳出局長角色，大翻殖民地舊帳，令人對民主民生雙雙欠奉的殖民舊社會，多加一分痛恨，聽後恨不得立即拿起槍桿子，去再革他媽殖民餘孽的命！
可是，這樣一來，曾德成必然是個孤獨戰士。因為香港從頭到尾，都是只有「洗底」而無真心誠意的「反殖」，更遑論「反殖革命」；有革命自慰，有托庇於革命政權的官，卻無革命分子。新社會和舊社會無法來一場大決裂，大決算，於是就把人人變得有一點像鬼，也把每隻鬼都變得有點像人。如論者所言：「滿城都是人不像人，鬼不像鬼！」
一貫躬行一種信念
如果鄭經翰所言的曾局長，的確是「沉實堅定，原則性強」的話，就沒有理由也只是鬼話連篇，「忽然反殖」，而是深入清算包括曾蔭權、葉劉淑儀在內的前殖民地高官，有多少是以「官主」冒充「民主」，以「官生」扮作「民生」。
為了扭轉長期殖民愚民的橫逆，嚴防殖民主義復辟的陰謀詭計，曾局長理應帶領香港社會各界，狠批「忽然主義」，主張「一貫」主義，並以「原則」為先。除了律己以嚴，少用司機之外，更應在香港這個「忽然妖術」當道的社會以身作則，明白說明自己如何「一貫」躬行一種信念，例如自己除了時刻跟緊中央外，如何貫徹他信奉的馬列主義。
曾局長早前說過，愛國是發自內心的天性，所以批判「忽然愛國」並不難。難卻難在所愛之國，為什麼多年來又會忽然親蘇，忽然反蘇？為什麼忽然批孔，今日又忽然尊孔？為什麼忽然批鄧，今天又忽然擁鄧？為什麼當日信奉全世界無產者團結起來，今日忽然容許資本家入黨？
相對於這些拿千萬國民來開玩笑的忽然歷史鬧劇，香港近日這些荒腔走板的忽然風波，其實也只是一齣小丑戲。而作為觀眾，香港人只是卑微地要求演員入戲一些而已。拜託。
曾局長，加油！
文﹕安徒
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(2) 安裕周記﹕三十年大夢將醒乎？ 文﹕安裕
這是一課很好的中國歷史溫故知新。我說的是那天曾德成局長在立法會議事堂上眉怒責陳方安生那一回。
中國近代史裏像曾局長那天的語言行為早已有之，香港市民不必大驚小怪，一九六六年六月二十日《人民日報》題為〈革命大字報是暴露一切牛鬼蛇神的照妖鏡〉的社評應該就是曾局長的先行者——「革命的大字報，大長無產階級的志氣，大長工農兵群眾的志氣；大滅反黨反社會主義一切反動派的威風，大滅資產階級權威老爺們的威風」。
半年之後的十二月二十七日，清華大學蒯大富在「首都徹底批判劉鄧資產階級反動路線誓師大會」上有這麼一段講話﹕「不管是台前的，還是幕後的，通通把他揪出來，暴露在光天化日之下，把他們打垮批臭砸爛，打入十八層地獄，叫他永世不得翻身！決不猶豫，決不留情，決不客氣，決不憐惜！」
眼熟不？那天曾局長把陳方安生議員批了個稀巴爛的時候，不免讓人想起《人民日報》和蒯大富這兩篇文章。把時間地點人名改動一下，我們那天看到的就是文化大革命批鬥的現代版。這一課中國近代史，比起帶學生翻山涉水去黃埔軍校到烏蛟騰來得實用﹕四十年前的中國，就是在這種睚眥必報復仇心理下，一天一天的爛下去。
那天的立法會議事紀錄應該是一份歷史，除了曾德成從歷史的高度來炮轟陳方安生，還有商務及經濟發展局長馬時亨講到迪士尼樂園合作條款時的「有很多當時的官員現在都坐在這裏」；工聯會議員王國興的「好似陳方安生那樣，可以十成按揭去買樓」。明的暗的合官民之力招呼一個老太太，若不是陳方安生的份量，那些牛頭馬臉哪有時間纏你？
陳方安生其實犯不動氣，議事堂上確是無事不可談，議員官員都有言論免責權，美英國會亦復如是，陳太要接受民主洗禮，這種以眾凌寡以男欺女就得適應一下了。至於陳太日後要不要動議為一九六七年暴動被左派暴徒土製炸彈炸得腸穿肚爛無辜身死的市民致哀；或是為商業電台播音員林彬離奇被殺重開死因研訊；又或是重新檢視英殖時代留到今天的政府官員對中華人民共和國政府的忠誠程度；甚或是傳召董建華到內會研訊到底中央人民政府在迪士尼樂園事件中有過什麼指示，那是陳太的在立法會的言論自由，人們不可置喙。
香港市民對曾德成一番文革語言的錯愕其來有自，香港是一九四九年中共建政後國人南逃避秦的安樂窩；對於政治，香港市民熟得不能再熟，一九四九年中共建政，一九六二年大量難民越境而來，一九六六年文革災難，七十年代初梧桐河日復一日的紅衛兵浮屍，還有介乎其間的天災人禍，四百萬市民感受深刻。到了一九七六年大陸逐漸肅清左毒，把心機都放在改革開放上，港人真心相信中共自今之後絕對不會把文革從歷史殘燼翻出來，想不到今天給曾德成這幾句話把人們從三十年的大夢裏驚醒過來。
三十年來唯才唯用不管左右
在這三十年，香港是百川匯流之地，官場誰上誰下都是閒事，左派右派當家只要管治得好公平公正，哪有人會說三道四。十幾年前左派在民主旗幟下組黨參政，右派無人質疑他們到底是不是真擁獨裁假護民主；香港就是這樣一個實用主義當頭的地方，一切唯才唯用。人們應該記得，在中英就香港政爭最烈的幾年，彭定康還邀請了民建聯幾位先生，包括曾德成兄長曾鈺成到港督府。我還記得電視片段裏，曾鈺成譚耀宗西裝筆挺的從港督府裏走出來，就站在車來車往馬路邊接受採訪。這次會面到底在客套的外交辭令底下談了些什麼，大概只有曾譚知曉，但曾譚他們到今天點滴在心頭的恐怕是﹕彭定康這癟三真有兩下子，明知民建聯是何許人也大袍大甲演這場戲。
幾十年來，香港左派在不同的戲台上都曾經粉墨登場，但從沒有一齣是擔正主角——一九六七年「反英抗暴」，死的傷的都是左派系統優秀人才，投獄三年出來之後，除了把傷病員送到一海之隔的澳門鏡湖醫院休養之外，沒有一句表揚；反過來卻飽受批評，左傾盲動主義、不識大體、強行出頭，這些說話三十年前左派機構誰都聽過，結果是左派內部開始了靜悄悄的大規模出國潮，主管們節衣縮食把兒女送去外國，有心人不妨明查暗訪，七十年代後期，本地左派頭面人物有誰沒有把兒女送到外國去？表面上這是對香港教育制度缺失的否定，實是對偉大祖國呼之則來揮之則去的強烈反彈。
就在同一時間，香港左派開始改頭換面的形象工程，這固然與中共全力開放改革有切肉不離皮的關係，然而也和時移勢易下的變身有關。於是，香港政治浮出一個頗為動聽的名詞﹕開明左派。這是一些走出來不像表叔的左派，他們口舌便給，形象討好，思想遠較傳統土共來得靈活。傳媒見此變化，打開大門張開雙臂歡迎，「政壇劉德華」、「政治電算機」這些名詞逐日逐日出現在報章政治版的字裏行間。那幾年香港仍在英治底下，左派心有避忌，但就在這種和緩氣氛之間，竟然造就了前所未有的左右共治、一團和氣的氛圍。
政見不同劃地為界並非新事，二百年前法國議會兩派各坐左右一方，從此才有左派右派之分，說到底大家都是同為社稷，無分彼此。香港在八十年代揭櫫代議政制討論時，立法會議席上首次出現工聯會代表譚耀宗，但是我們的社會確實難得，沒有人把「左派」標籤硬套在他頭上。平情而論，當年的譚耀宗確有開明左派模樣，從無惡形惡相，只有文質彬彬，時間久了，一些政府咨詢委員會開始也有左派人士入閣。表述這一深邃變化，絕對不可以脫離當年的大格局，隨深化改革開放，中國國力明顯增強，香港左派漸獲認同，這是大氣候改變了小氣候，絕非小氣候改變了大氣候。遺憾的是，部分左派本末倒置，以為是自己扭轉了香港市民的認知，不幸這就是香港左派自滿自負，走向另一個極端的開始。
新一代的香港左派和老一輩迥異，老左派都知道，周恩來對身邊工作人員要求極嚴，第一條就是謙虛謹慎，港澳左派老人大多跟隨周恩來系統，這一點做到十足——如費彝民，如霍英東，如何賢，如莊世平，如王寬城，他們在港英澳葡打壓下，低頭彎腰做好本分﹕沒有費公，中法建交還得再拖幾年；霍英東七十年末已把整副家當投入前途未卜的改革開放事業；何賢晚年一心一意在全國人大；莊世平兒子只是司機；王寬城穿的是布鞋，一捐國家便是一億美元。但他們從沒趾高氣揚，以霍英東的全國政協副主席身分，回歸後若要重翻因為星光行而被迫穿小鞋的舊帳，今天香港首富不大可能是姓李的了。
港人寬大 不記六七舊事
香港市民是寬大為懷的，社會早就淡忘一九六七年夏天的種種舊事，人人都是歷史過客，總不成事事往後看而不朝前走。霍英東去世，連最反共的《壹週刊》也在專輯實事求是讚揚霍是「難得的愛國人士」，曾德成獲委民政事務局長，李卓人等民主派沒有一句閒言；歷史經過沉澱泛出光華。可是新一代的左派卻不明白自己的真正位置，他們踏先輩開出來的荊棘羊腸走上了青雲路，最後卻是樂極生悲，頭撞南牆。程介南事件響起了警號，有左派心裏疑惑「我們到底是誰？」老左派搖頭嘆息者大不乏人，香港社會也因而對左派重新評價。雖然左派內部有人把這些批評視之為敵我矛盾，認定是不懷好意，但錚錚事實都放在人們眼前。
開明左派？不過皮相
曾德成在議事堂上公開羞辱陳方安生，引起如斯巨大反應，相必是他事前料想不到的。議會攻訏本是雞毛蒜皮小事，官員之間你來我往更是民主社會特色，但只要看過聽到曾德成那天的講話內容，誰都知道這是一番帶什麼含意的發言，林行止的分析最是一針見血，「是傳統親共力量總動員力壓陳太，卻無法對抗十多萬有自由選擇選民崇尚民主追求雙普選的意志因而惱羞成怒的投射」。陳方安生不過一介退休高官，任期只有八個月不到，何須堂堂局長以文革式惡言相向，這說明了左派無法忍受陳方安生的勝選，到了議事堂上終於按捺不住爆發。孰料這一爆發，把三十年來在人們記憶裏早已忘記的歷史一下子都翻了出來，開明左派云乎，精明跳脫云乎，民主建港云乎，原來俱是皮相之談。
多年前，曾聽過一次肺腑剖白，文革極左思潮之下，香港左派拱手讓出所有，全心投入階級鬥爭不能自拔。林彪墜機後，鄧小平復出主持工作，香港左派要找回失聯的昔日各界友人，做法是大年初一賀歲波開賽前，在大球場場館門外逐一與階級敵人握手言歸於好。也由於這種誠懇態度，社會上開始接受浪子回頭的左派，畢竟在文革這場巨禍中，他們也是受蒙蔽的一群。然而，這種教訓一次是不足夠的，香港左派的極左思潮往往隔不久就會來一次，就像是肺結核無法根治一樣。左派的世界是普通市民不能理解的世界，永遠是左傾勝於右傾，左傾過了頭，像這次曾局長的忽然激動，如果說是有問題，頂多是認識上的錯誤，好心做壞事，不是路線問題，還有機會翻身；如果對陳方安生歡笑擁抱，那是原則問題，是對一個同志能不能夠頂住右傾機會主義的考驗。這種寧左勿右的思維乍聽之下令人失笑，但事實卻是這是中共在歷次黨內外鬥爭下的生存哲學。
發生在曾局長身上的某些舊事，殆無疑問是在香港的中國人的悲哀，內地早就有定論，人們起初也希望曾局長能以一個過來人身分，共同譴責和批判十年浩劫年間，國人懷疑一切、打倒一切的唯上思考模式。中共在歷史上走過這些彎路，所以江澤民胡錦濤一再說不會有政治運動，同心同德振興經濟，打造和諧社會，這些話到底落實到香港還能剩下多少，看來江胡兩位要失望了：他們萬萬想不到，在內地被十三億人民唾棄了三十年的文化大革命幽靈，竟然在香港這塊回歸只有十年的西化社會裏借屍還魂，大白天在中環立法會內出現。
文﹕安裕
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(3) 殖民的幽靈 文﹕陳景輝
http://www.inmediahk.net/public/article?item_id=276084&group_id=53
民政事務局長曾德成一番忽然民生的言論，矛頭直指「今日的議員，昔日的高官」陳方安生。他反駁陳太「沒有民主就沒有民生」的說法，因為陳太過去也曾參與了不民主的殖民統治。
就是說，如果陳的民主民生言論成立的話，那麼，她殖民地時期負責過的民生工作，豈非子虛烏有。換句話，曾德成的反問是這樣的，為什麼昨日的你願意效力「不民主的殖民統治」，而現在卻反過來針對同樣不民主的特區政府進行呢？這豈非持著「今時不同往日」的雙重標準嗎？
其中，滿帶著家仇國恨、最為情詞懇切的莫過於一句「不民主的殖民統治」。很多人說，我們要「對事不對人」，所以曾德成不應該挖政敵個人的歷史來做箭靶。然而，所謂「不民主殖民統治」又豈是陳方安生個人的歷史﹖除非你天真地認為殖民統治就只有開明一面，否則的話如何重估這歷史就十分重要。
早陣子，陳方安生在遮打花園舉行的補選論壇上，也有過一段反省殖民統治、具歷史感的開場白﹕「今晚真是令人感觸良多，遮打花園昔日是殖民地特權階級的木球場，但這裡今日已經成為香港人爭取民主、權益的地方」。
我要補充，中環遮打花園可能已不再是特權階層的木球場，但社會上還有千千百百個隱而未見、延續自殖民地的「遮打花園」，它包括功能組別、小圈子選舉產生的特首等，這些都是為回歸後特權階級的「政治木球場」。因此，一種具有歷史感的民主運動，就應該以批判殖民統治開始。畢竟，回歸之後，特區政府繼承了種種源自殖民時代的威權統治遺產。我們應該向曾德成發問同樣的問題﹕為什麼當初你反對不民主的殖民統治，但現在你要擠身這個特權階層，變臉成你當初憎恨的對象？
根據他哥哥曾鈺成的回憶，當年曾德成在自已就讀的中學派發一些反對奴化教育的單張，「要求改革學校課程，指摘英國發動鴉片戰爭」。恐怖的是，作為一個在午飯時間派發單張的中六生，既沒示威也沒放炸彈，為的只是勇敢地說出自己的歷史看法，但卻遭到自己的校長報警，最後更吃了兩年牢獄之災。
荒謬的是，曾經領略過殖民政府粗暴干預結社集會自由的這些「左派」人士，回歸後非但沒有繼續他們追求社會公義的努力，反而在完全不民主的臨時立法會中「還原」公安惡法，進一步干預結社集會自由。
就算陳方安生過去真的是「助紂為虐」的殖民地高官，她也比曾德成進步﹕前者是由威權轉為民主，後者則相反地從反殖民統治變臉成殖民地威權遺產的繼承者。在民主發展標尺下，誰是進步一方，已經不言而喻。
在很多由威權轉向為民主的外國經驗中，在政權的轉變和更迭之後，往往牽涉政治上大量的自我檢討工作，從而使一個地方不會走威權統治的回頭路，它稱作「轉型正義」(transitional justice)。根據台灣政治學者江宜樺的說法，它是指「威權或極權統治時期，當政者曾經對人民(尤其是異議份子)所拖加種種暴行(如任意逮捕、囚禁、酷刑、殺害、栽贓、侵占等等)，到了民主轉型成功之後，都必須在正義原則下，獲得釋放、平反、道歉、賠償，或司法上的訴究。在過去的政治學的文獻中，人們稱此種彌補措施為「溯往正義」(retrospective justice)，現在由於『民主轉型』研究的盛行，學者改稱之為『轉型正義』」。
換言之，曾德成白吃了的兩年牢獄，又或者六六年的蘇守忠只是單純絕食卻被無理檢控，這些都應該獲得平反。而「平反」不是針對個人的歷史，而是全盤檢討使各種政治打壓成為可能的政治法律制度，例如公安條例。可是，這種反省工作沒有在香港發生，因為香港的所謂「回歸」，並不是由威權轉向民主，而是威權的延續。於是，如曾德成之流，不會再如當年般反對，今天無殖民之名，卻延續殖民之實的回歸後特區政府。時移世易，他更以一種管治階層的咀臉反問﹕「過去殖民者可以，為什麼我現在不行﹖」
文化評論人梁文道呼籲在人人都是民主派的今天，泛民應重劃政治光譜；馬國明更認為泛民應以檢討殖民管治模式為已任，深化我們的民主運動。
附拙評:
陳景輝 said, (A): "如果陳的民主民生言論成立的話，那麼，她殖民地時期負責過的民生工作，豈非子虛烏有。" And further, (B):"換句話，曾德成的反問是這樣的，為什麼昨日的你願意效力「不民主的殖民統治」，而現在卻反過來針對同樣不民主的特區政府進行呢﹖這豈非持著「今時不同往日」的雙重標準嗎﹖" (A) is an accurate interpretation of 曾德成's critique of 陳方安生; but (B) is not.
At issue is NOT why 陳方安生 served the Colonial Government, and yet now takes an oppositional stand vis-a-vis the HKSAR Government. At issue, rather, is the attempt of 陳方安生 tactically to cry up the necessity of democracy, while her own track record clearly shows that democracy is NOT a precondition for social improvement.
Read again 陳方安生's statement: "沒有民主就沒有民生." It means no more nor less than this, (C): "If there is 民生, then there is 民主." But 陳方安生 herself oversaw a huge number of policies meant - not unreasonably - to effect social improvement. There, in other words, was indeed 民生 during her political service, unless she chose to deny all that she had seemingly contributed to 民生 in those patently undemocratic days. If 陳方安生 did not choose to deny it, then she must concede that (C) does not hold; she cannot have the cake and eat it.
陳方安生's own service proved, very clearly, that there can be 民生 without 民主. The fact that it is she who now tries to proclaim the contrary, must appear particularly ironic; and it is on this irony that 曾德成's critique delightedly feeds. 陳景輝 understands this irony - hence his accurate interpretation in (A) - but refuses to let it stand as such. It is probably because he himself believes in (C) so much, that he cannot stand the sight of letting (C) be disproved by - alas! - the great achievements (in the past) of his new-found comrade 陳方安生. To cover up the deep irony, he evokes "殖民的幽靈"; but all in vain. For no talk of colonialism can ever remove the patent inconsistency 陳方安生 herself exhibited. 陳景輝 should affirm this, in good faith, and go back to his old tune of colonialism in another essay.
Y.T.
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Zeppelinfeld, Nuremberg Rally, and Song of the Nazi Party.
標籤:
Y.T.
Zeppelinfeld, Nuremberg Rally, and Song of the Nazi Party.
To envisage Heidegger's lecture on the Origin of the Work of Art in context (see my former post), it may be helpful to consider the following:
Zeppelinfeld
(1) Documentation about the Zeppelinfeld: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kAz9t_p1qA - a very nice clip showing the Zeppelinfeld in the 1930s.
(2) Further Pictures of the Zeppelinfeld:
- (i) http://nurembergrallies.mysite.wanadoo-members.co.uk/page4.html
- (ii) http://nurembergrallies.mysite.wanadoo-members.co.uk/page6.html
(3) A essay on the Zeppelinfeld (with pictures of it today):http://www.scrapbookpages.com/Nurnberg/Nurnberg04.html
- There is also a picture showing a piece of modern art in front of the Fascination and Violence Musuem.
Nuremberg Rallies
(4) Schedules of the Nuremberg Rallies from 1934 to 1938:http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Party%20Day/Nurembergschedules.htm
* Notice that at the closing of the first day of rally in both 1935 and 1936 there was a performance of Richard Wagner's Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg. Another source suggested that this was the practice in every Nuremberg Rally.
(5) Tag der Freiheit! Unsere Wehrmacht by Leni Riefenstahl: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lRzd8yhX7hY - Propaganda film made by Riefenstahl at the 1935 Rally in Nuremberg. Her other film, Triumph des Willens , was made in the 1934 Rally. List of the Rallies (details not entirely accurate) is given at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_Rallies
Song of the Nazi Party
(6) The Horst-Wessel Liedhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpLYZ432abc - Song of the Nazi Party; lyrics at:
(7) Lyrics of the Horst-Wessel Lied (German original and English translation):http://www.anesi.com/east/horstw.htm
(8) The Lied as sung in a Nuremberg Rally:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQBhxOFjCn0
Heidegger, the Temple, and the Origin of the Work of Art.
標籤:
Y.T.
Whether Heidegger picked up a key idea--like a hot potato--from the Book of Tea , we may never tell; but another hot potato case seems to be in sight. I mean the discussion on Heidegger's famous essay on the Origin of the Work of Art, by Emmanuel Faye in his recent book Heidegger: I'introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie (Paris: Albin Michel, 2005, seconde edition). Faye does not charge Heidegger of plagiarism, but of something much more serious. Heidegger, he argues, had in mind, when delivering that lecture (or series of lectures, see below) which eventually became the famous essay, nothing less than the Nuremberg Rally of 1935; his "temple" was not any temple, but the Zeppelin Field Tribune, which was, it is true, inspired by the Pergamon Altar of Ancient Greece allegedly dedicated to Zeus. Relevant passages from the book are given below, with German originals in square brackets. For your convenience, I shall attempt a rough English translation of the passages.
Review:
Faye's book has substantially revived the scholarly debate on the relationship between Heidegger's Thought and the Nazi Worldview. A brief review, which tries to situate the book in the recent debate can be found at: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.cgi?path=216231158766616
Images:
Images of some architectural works mentioned in the passages can be found at:
(1) Zeppelin Field:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeppelin_Field
(2) The Zeppelin Field Tribune: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Reichsparteitagsgelaende_Zeppelinfeld_Tribuene_68.JPG(3) Pergamon Altar:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pergamon_Altar
Excerpt from Faye's Book:
[pp.526-29, la seconde edition.] Le Temple, La Conférence sur L'œuvre d'art et le congrès de Nuremberg de 1935.
Heidegger ne cherche pas la signification de la polis grecque dans les écrits des philosophes, il ne revoie pas à la Politeia de Platon ou à la Politique d'Aristote, mais cite deux vers d'Homère. Plus tard, dans son cours du semestre d'été 1935 intitulé Introduction à la métaphysique, Heidegger prétendra que l'histoire, à ses origines, est mythologie. Ici, il entend poser un fondement existentiel qui serait plus originel que la communauté et l'assemblé humaine de la politeia, un « milieu » (Mitte) qui serait déterminant pour « l'existence historique » d'un peuple, d'une race, d'un clan. Notons qu'il ne commente pas les vers en suivant l'ordre exact des mots : là où Homère évoque en premier l'enceinte et les maisons, Heidegger identifie ce milieu tout d'abord au temple. En rapportant ainsi la polis à un centre sacré, il manifeste que sa conception du politique n'est pas philosophique mais, pourrai-on dire faute de mieux et pour reprendre l'un de ses termes, mythologique.
Or, cette valorisation heideggérienne du temple est reprise et amplifiée la même année dans la conférence sur « L'origine de l'œuvre d'art ». Cette conférence est prononcée pour la première fois le 13 novembre 1935 Fribourg, une deuxième fois le 17 janvier 1936 à Zurich, et une troisième fois (en trois parties) à Francfort les 17, 24 novembre et 4 décembre 1936. Le texte paru en 1949 dans les Holzwege reprend les trois conférences de Francfort, vraisemblablement retouchées après la guerre. Deux versions antérieures ont également été publiées, l'une en 1987, l'autre en 1989. Dans la version la plus connue, celle des Holzwege, Heidegger évoque le temple grec et semble donc se reporter au passé. [« Ein Bauwek, ein griechischer Tempel … »] Mais dans la version primitive, éditée en 1989 par Hermann Heidegger—l'année du centenaire de la naissance de Heidegger et de Hitler--, il n'est pas explicitement question du temple grec. [Dans cette première version, on lit : « Das Bauwerk, der als Tempel die Gestalt des Gottes einbehält … »] La référence à l'architecture grecque est certainement toujours à l'arrière-plan, mais il n'est parlé que du temple, comme œuvre architecture, en tant qu'il ouvre le « là » où « un peuple accède à lui-même, c'est-à-dire dans la puissance ordonnatrice de son dieu ». [« … eröffnet der Tempel das Da, worin ein Volk zu sich selbst, d.h. in die fügende Macht seines Gottes kommt »]
Or, en novembre 1935, le fait de se référer au temple comme « milieu enraciné et étendu, dans lequel et à partir duquel un peuple fonde son séjour historique », et cela dans une conférence où il est explicitement question du peuple allemand, évoque nécessairement, aux auditeurs de l'époque, le congrès qui s'est tenu deux mois plus tôt à Nuremberg. Cette année-là, en effet le congrès de la NSDAP et les discours du Führer avaient eu lieu dans l'enceinte du Zeppelinfeld, bordé par une tribune de 360 mètres à laquelle des colonnades et des vasques donnaient une allure de temple grec. Cette Zeppelintribüne était d'ailleurs inspirée d'un édifice antique : l'Autel de Pergame.
On sait que Hitler avait choisi Nuremberg comme lieu symbolique, au centre de l'Allemagne, pour les congrès annuels du Parti qui se déroulaient chaque année pendant une semaine, généralement en septembre. Et il avait conçu, avec l'architecte et futur ministre de l'Armement Albert Speer, le site des congrès du parti national-socialiste, dont seule la Zeppelintribüne sera entièrement construite. La mise en scène, à chaque fois « grandiose », était destinée à démontrer la solidarité du peuple et du Führer. Or 1935, c'est l'année où, sous le nom de « congrès de la liberté », sont proclamées les lois antisémites, dites « de Nuremberg ». Cette année-là, cent cinquante projecteurs de la DCA dressent jusqu'au ciel des colonnades de lumière, qui viennent délimiter l'espace où la foule est rassemblée pour écouter Hitler. C'est ainsi que le temple de marbre se double d'un temple de lumière. Le Zeppelinfeld n'est plus « qu'une mer de svastikas, éclairée de nuit par des torches ». Parler deux mois plus tard, dans sa conférence, du « temple » où le peuple « accède à lui-même »--ce qui est une conception non pas grecque, mais nazie--et de la « clairière » (Lichtung), telle est la façon choisie par Heidegger pour célébrer le congrès du Nuremberg de septembre 1935. C'est pourquoi la conférence sur « L'origine de l'œuvre d'art » est, dans sa signification historique et politique réelle, un texte qui n'est pas loin d'être aussi odieux que celui publié par Carl Schmitt dans la Deutsche Juristen Zeitung, le 1 er octobre 1935, pour célébrer les lois de Nuremberg sous le titre : « La constitution de la liberté ». […]
Rendering of the Same in English:
Heidegger does not find the meaning of the Greek polis in the writings of the philosophers, he does not go back to Plato's Republic or to Aristotle's Politics, but cite two verses from Homer. Later, in his course in the summer semester of 1935, entitled "Introduction to Metaphysics," Heidegger claimed that history, in its origin, is mythological. Here he means to lay an existential foundation which would be more original than the human community and assembly of the politeia [regime, constitution, government - Y.T.], a milieu which would be determinative of the "historical existence" of a people, of a race, of a clan. Note that he does not comment on the verses by following the exact order of the words: whereas Homer first evokes the enclosure and the houses, Heidegger identifies this milieu straightway with the temple. In thus relating the polis to a sacred center, he shows that his conception of the political is not philosophical but--in want of a better term and to follow one of his own--mythological.
This Heideggerian valorization of the temple is repeated and amplified in the same year in the lecture on "The Origin of the Work of Art." This lecture is given for the first time on November 13, 1935 in Freiburg, a second time on January 17, 1936 in Zurich, and a third time (in three parts) in Frankfurt on November 17, 24, and December 4, 1936. The texte published in 1949 in the Holzwege reprints the three Frankfurt lectures, seemingly reworked after the war. Two older versions have also been published, one in 1987, the other in 1989. In the version most well-known, namely, that of the Holzwege, Heidegger evokes the Greek temple and seems therefore to go back to the past. [« Ein Bauwek, ein griechischer Tempel … »] But in the primitive version, edited by Hermann Heidegger [son of the philosopher] in 1989--centenary of the birth of Heidegger and of Hitler--it is not expressly about the Greek temple. [ « Das Bauwerk, der als Tempel die Gestalt des Gottes einbehält … »] The reference to Greek architecture is certainly always in the background, but it is only so much about the temple, as an architectural work, in that it opens up the "there," wherein "a people comes to itself, that is, into the subjugating power of its god."
In Novermber 1935, to refer to the temple as "milieu rooted and extensive, in which and from which a peiople founds its historical abode," and this in a lecture where it is expressly about the German peole, evokes necessarily, among the listeners of the time, the congress which was held two months earlier in Nuremberg. That year, the NSDAP Congress and the speeches of the Führer had taken place inside the Zeppelin Field, bordered by a tribune of 360 meters, to which the colonnades and the basins gave an allure of a Greek temple. This Zeppelin Field, moreover, was inspired by a ancient edifice: the Pergamon Altar.
We know that Hitler had chosen Nurember as a symbolic place--at the center of Germany--for the annual congress of the Party which lasted each year for a week, usually in September. And he had conceived, with the architect and future minister of armament, Albert Speer, the site of the congress of the Nazi Party, of which only the Zeppelin Field would be completed. The mise en scene, grandiose every time, was meant to demonstrate the solidarity of the people and the Führer. In 1935, the year when, under the name of "Congress of Freedom," the antisemitic laws were promulgated--the Nuremberg Laws. That year, hundred and fifty DCA projectors erect colonnades of light up to the sky, which are to delimit the space where the crowd is assembled in order to listen to Hitler. This way, the temple of marble doubles itself in a temple of light. the Zeppelin Field becomes but a sea of swastikas, illuminated throughout the night by torches. To speak two months later, in his lecture, of the "temple" wherein the people "comes to itself"--which is not a Greek, but a nazi, conception--and of the lighting: such is the way chosen by Heidegger to celebrate the Congress of Nuremberg of September 1935. This is why the lecture on "The Origin of the Work of Art" is, in its real historical and political meaning, a text which is not far from being as obnoxious as that published by Carl Schmitt in the Deutsche Juristen Zeitung, on October 1, 1935, to celebrate the Nuremberg Laws, entitled: "The Constitution of Freedom."
Comments on 張彧暋's Essay "民主可能不是什麼"
標籤:
Y.T.
張彧暋﹕民主可能不是什麼 (from HK Mingpao, Nov. 10, 07; Essay to follow my Comments)
Comments: The author explores in this Essay the mutual implication of democracy and a collective sense of empowerment, the failure of one, hence of the other, being in his view "香港社會問題的癥結." Democracy, to be true, must, according to that view, be more than a matter of the ballot; it must be something that, within the bounds of modern social life, approximates nevertheless the collective enchantment sufficient to give rise, in primitive groupings, to a totem. No more trance; but festivities, assemblies, demonstrations, confrontations, or sit-ins, vigils, etc. Democracy, in this conception, flows not from Mill's Representative Government but from Durkheim's Elementary Forms; it is high-energy politics announcing and actualizing collective self-determination.
One difficulty with this conception--and here I do not mean thereby to underrate the truth this conception is to offer--is that high-energy politics is usually not sustainable on a large scale beyond a few decisive moments: even primitive men and women could not go into trance all the time. Things will, and have to, cool down. Does that imply then, that, in the normal course of things, a collective sense of empowerment must be elusive, if that sense be built upon these rare-to-have decisive moments? A nation with an honorable history of high-energy politics, not to say strikes and revolutions, need not be one wherein the people will not feel disempowered. France (a rather democratic case), say, or various countries in Latin America.
If democracy of the festivity sort need not promise a collective sense of empowerment (beyond, again, a few decisive moments), then perhaps a collective sense of empowerment need not come from democracy either. Think of the early days of the PRC--I mean the early 50s. That sense might not be sustainable in the long run either; for it comes, not from democracy, but from a sentiment that there is a project, a vision, a future, such that each person's contributing thereto genuinely confers meaning to his or her present work; a collective sense of empowerment hinges not upon the collective exercise of (political) power, but upon the collective participation in a meaning-conferring enterprise.
I submit that in the long run meaning is even more fundamental to the sense of empowerment than democratic festivity is; but that in the long run meaning, or the search for meaning, might depend on things much more mundane: work satisfaction, life quality, risk insurance, leisure, cultural activities, entertainment, some overall perception of the society's health, etc. Democracy of the festivity sort might add to the appeal of these good things (now that they are my creation); but at the end it is the having of these things that is crucial for most people; and such having, democracy cannot promise.
It is tempting to argue, that the fundamental problem of HK is political--lack of democracy. But sociologists--and the author of this Essay is himself one--have long suggested that long-wave economic changes are no less part of the story. Can a change in politics bring about an improvement in the economics? I am not so sure. But absent an investigation into this question, further stress on the political being 香港社會問題的癥結 may be a little distracting. - Y.T.
【明報專訊】在社會學的導修課上，我問同學，你要是研究一個你自己真正關心的課題，你研究什麼？有幾位傳理系與社會系的同學答：「民主普選問題！」我說：「你講笑吧？」其他同學就咯咯大笑起來。理由呢？大家真正關心的，莫非感情、考試、選科、飯堂、還有校園交通問題。
在香港談民主與愛國，其實沒有什麼令人覺得真切的反應。可是我們還得談一談，因為這關乎我們生活在現代社會中，該如何排除個人的孤獨感的問題。西方政治思想史中自由與民主兩個概念，本來就不怎麼調和，更何香港社會一直以前者作為核心價值。可是，縱使民主毫不關乎我們的日常生活，要是只談自由不談民主，我們將會面對集體的失落與無力感，而這正是香港社會問題的癥結。
民主是一種集體與神聖的社會祭典
早陣子特首的民主 文革論，錯在哪裏？這其實是很簡單的邏輯問題罷了。「很多／凡民主運動都是集體行為」，並不能引伸出「凡集體行為都叫民主」。集體地看煙花、新年倒數，我們都不會叫做民主。單靠「很多人一起亢奮地進行集體活動」這點，不一定是民主。
另一方面，民主必然是集體性的。雖然跟現代意義的民主不同，看看希臘雅典就知道，為什麼民主必須是一種人們透過自發參與的集體活動。幾千名雅典公民運用個人意志，在面對巴特農神殿的廣場聚集，然後全民議論、投票，全體意志統一了以後，形成一道強烈的「社會氣流」，而柏拉圖所說的「哲人王」，就是能上通諸神意志，下通全體世俗的統治者。而無論在古代西方、中國以至日本，政治本來就是祭祀天地之事。古希臘民主也類近宗教祭典，不過是以全民參與的方式進行。在此，希臘人找到自己在群體中的存在感。
可是，民主主義跟演唱會的最大不同是，每個人都是發自內心，為了一個公的利益而D動參與，講出自己真心相信的意見，互相討論與說服對方，而並非文革中互相欺瞞的情。因此，民主的理想狀態就是在投票日全體市民都抱興奮與熱切期待的心情晨早去投票。對於從未以個人力量爭取到政治改革的社會來說，這當然很困難了。
大江健三郎在1960年日本戰後最大的民主運動安保抗爭的時候，寫了這段文字：
「日本年輕人之所以對日本人失望，是因為他們沒有真正感覺到自己能參與建設國家。日本的政治，只是在大家能力範圍之外的地方進行，因此大家唯有放棄參與政治。這兩種感情，只是建基於一種前提之下，那就是日本還在美國的支配之下，能決定日本的命運的並非日本人自己的意志。於是，日本年輕人從心底絕望、從根本地對政治毫無關心。要令大家面對這種現實，必須首先不害怕認識這個事實。要回復日本年輕人對國家的熱情，其實是很簡單的，那就是必須令日本不成為外國的基地。」 (《戰後青年的日本復歸》)
那一年，戰犯首相岸信介，聽隨美國的指示，無視日本人的意願，強行通過日美安全 保障的相關法例。也就是那一年，幾十萬日本人自發的走上街頭遊行，包圍國會。
香港又是如何的呢？我們必須回到過去的遊行歷史，感受這種集體氣流與神聖的祭典。因此，我們討論香港民主的起點，並非投票箱，而是兩次七一祭典之後的茫茫旅途。
Observations on a recent Essay by 梁文道
標籤:
Y.T.
梁文道's recent Essay on 人民民主--prompted, as it is, by the CE's comparing extreme democracy to the Cultural Revolution--is no doubt an interesting exercise in political philosophy, taking as its object the rehabilitation of a notion that is destined to have no market in HK. The thrust of the Essay is to unsettle our dominant tendency "對任何其他種類的民主理念都嗤之以鼻，覺得它們都是掛羊頭賣狗肉的假民主，比如說中華人民共和國一度標榜的「人民民主」"; but to unsettle is not yet to overthrow, which would require a much stronger case as to why that other notion be indeed superior.
It is a grave error, I believe, to think and speak of democracy in modern polities paying well-nigh exclusive attention to what happens or does not happen most spectacularly in the legislature, even though there be where media visibility tends to concentrate. Courts, the Monetary Authorities, and many other technocratic-administrative bodies which are needed to support the well-functioning of modern social life, and which often cannot fulfill their mission without a certain degree of independence from the vagaries of popular sentiments, pose, in their totality, a deep question as to whether the time-honored discourses on democracy might not as well be time-bound to their historical contexts.
If political philosophers and legal philosophers are ready to face the challenge put to notions of democracy by technocratic-administrative bodies and courts, economists, in their more philosophical moments, are equally delighted to point out, that commentators in favor of more direct forms of democracy routinely pass over the un-democratic nature of monetary policy-making which, so far as the average citizen's pocket is concerned, is no less consequential than changes in the tax schedule. Few commentators, even enthusiastic supporters for more direct forms of democracy, would be so rash as to demand that monetary policy be subject to popular control. Yet any change in the interest rate, if we give it a little more thought, will affect the distribution of wealth in very concrete and immediate ways, between the debtor class and the creditor class, between those who are burdended by home-mortgages and those who are holders of interest-paying bonds. If it be suggested, that good and effective monetary policy-making requires so long a horizon into the future as rarely to be had if the people are in control of it, the same argument--no doubt a well-rehearsed one in its general form--seems equally applicable to matters of taxation, of adjudication, etc. The vagaries of popular sentiments are, in all these areas, properly to be distrusted.
Ignorace and Inconsistency seem, then, to be two major causes why the people is to be feared. Both causes are admittedly relative: ignorance is relative to the amount of information and experience required for good judgment; inconsistency, to the degree of precision and stability required for a certain sort of policy to be effectively carried out. But developments in modern social life tend to cry up the demand for all four: more information, more experience, more precision, more stability. Now of course there is a typical answer to these demands: more education on the part of the citizenry. The question set up this way, however, the desirability of more direct forms of democracy will no more be a matter of legitimacy or such-like, but a relative and empirical matter, dependent upon how likely the citizenry, composed of ordinary people, might win the race. In the domain of monetary policy, the outcome is for the most part a foregone conclusion.
There are a few remarks in 梁文道's Essay that I think are not entirely correct or palatable. Of which let me take three to task.
1. Rousseau. "法國大革命的思想導師盧騷就很反對代議民主，他覺得選一幫專業政治人代表全民執政議政根本不足以體現人民的意志，頂多只是「加總式的意志」(will of all)而非更民主的「全體意志」(general will)。" I am not sure from what writing of Rousseau's has the writer derived such a proposition. Rousseau spoke of the general will--which, as a notion, has more a genealogy in the Roman republican tradition of the common good--but he also conceded, more than once, that in practice the general will was mostly to be known by counting heads in the legislature, which of course was what he (sometimes contemptuously) meant by the will of all. Many subsequent political writers rejected the general will as too metaphysical, if not outright totalitarian. In fact, the general will, in Rousseau's scheme of things, can, in the ultimate, over-rule the will of all; which is to say, he who is said to have discerned the general will--the common good--is allowed, in fact required, to regard the majority of the people as in ignorance of what is best for them. This is, for some, patently the highest form of contempt of the people. In brief, the distinction between the general will and the will of all is not, as 梁文道 would have us believe, about the relative merits of representative and direct democracy--that is never Rousseau's real concern; but about, in a deep sense, the tension between knowledge and politics--a tension which archeologists of knowledge might delightfully trace back to Plato's Republic and Laws.
2. The Cultural Revolution. "再回到「文革」的問題，沒人可以輕易否認它出自於毛澤東奪權鬥爭的個人目的，更沒有人能夠否定「十年浩劫」帶來的災難和痛苦。但是單純地在文革和獨裁之間畫上等號，就太過輕視當時受鼓動的百姓的自由意志了。直到今天為止，都還有部分內地「新左派」的學者和外國的激進思想家如巴迪烏(Alain Badiou)以為文革在早期確實是場「真正的革命」、「民主的實驗」。你可以說毛澤東講的「大民主」只是煽動人心的說詞，但是你不能說那些佔領學校的學生和衝進政府單位奪公章的人全都不是「人民民主」的真誠信徒。對不少當時的參與者而言，文革真正是從根本改造人性，徹底打倒官僚體制，達成「沒有黨派也不再有國家機器」之革命理想的「偉大鬥爭」，是「人民民主」這個理念的終極落實。" It is not clear whether the conclusion the writer drew from his description of the Cultural Revolution is meant to further his case for "people's democracy" or in fact to destroy it. It is certainly true, that many people who were attracted to the Revolution and hence mobilized for its alleged goals did, at least in the beginning, entertain a certain ideal which might, even in hindsight, be called noble. But that ideal, as the writer himself conceded, was purely utopian, sustained throughout by the belief that modern social life could be had in a state of nature, so to speak; in, that is, a state of constant mobilization, accompanied by a constant resistance to entering the state of civil society, where things must needs be cooled down. It is this cult of the permanent revolution, this desire to keep going back to square one, that is, not anti-modern (for some would say that this cult and this desire, born no later than in the French Revolution, are precisely what distinguish the modern view of politics from the ancient--again a Western genealogy, I admit), but truly anti-civilizational, if civilization be taken to mean the attempt and need, collectively, normatively, and practically to settle down.
3. The Genealogy of Democracy. "說了這麼半天，我的意圖絕非是要平反文革的惡名，也不是要替中共的極權體制塗脂抹粉，更不是想為曾蔭權開脫錯誤；恰恰相反，我是要提供一個現代中國官方民主概念的系譜，循此才能看到曾蔭權的真正問題。" This large claim is I think largely illusionary. The CE's spectacular remark has little to do with views of democracy, direct or otherwise, in the Mainland; nor do we need to learn those views in order to make sense, or fun, of the said remark. It is rather with the effort, among certain social activists--or, as some would call them, new leftists--to promote more direct forms of democracy in HK, that certain intellectual responses to the remark have to do. This time the writer has refrained from discoursing on de-colonialization; but he could well have linked that sort of discourse to direct democracy, Alain Badiou, and all that. He could even have subsumed the two discourses under the same grand rubric: Empowerment . Of the people, of course, this empowerment, which will indeed be a very honest translation of the word democracy. But all this, I repeat, would be quite independent from the so-called genealogy of democracy in the Mainland. The fear of the people, be it found in HK, in the Mainland, in the United States or in the Euroland, has its origin in the same sort of intellectual and practical concerns, in the context of modern polities and in the history of power distribution therein. To explain it simply in terms of a distrust of the people, without further explaining why, and when, the people are, and are to be, distrusted, is to end a long fugue on a very trivial coda; but the coda is just too sonorous for 梁文道 not to repeat it as such.
HK Mingpao. Oct 25, 2007.
害怕人民
- 梁文道
特首曾蔭權把文化大革命說成是種民主，以此警告香港市民，民主步伐不可操之過急，結果引來強烈反彈，逼得他第二天急急道歉。看來他果然是說錯話了，然而他到底錯在什麼地方呢？各方的意見卻頗見混淆。例如有人發現內地沒有一家傳媒轉載和報道香港行政長官的這番言論，以此證明他的錯誤有多嚴重。這種錯是一種不懂內地政治氛圍的錯，不明白「文革」二字至今仍是官場禁忌，等閒不能訴之於口。更多人則指他侮辱了民主，因為「文革」恰恰是獨裁專政的結果，完全站在民主的對立面，可見曾蔭權的國史常識非常糟。
但是曾蔭權真的錯了嗎？也有人持不同的看法，馬家輝兄就是眾口一詞中的諤諤一士，他在〈他沒有全錯，你們也沒有全對——曾蔭權最需要的不是國情教育〉(《明報》2007年10月23日)一文中指出﹕「文革是濫權，民主是限權」。意思是曾蔭權並非不知道「文革」那種「誰跑得快，誰先到，先到公章搶到手，權就是誰的了」的真相，他只是不懂民主絕非盲目地追求權力濫用權力罷了。純粹為了討論，我們還可以進一步追問﹕為什麼人人鬥快搶公章，人人爭先奪權就不是民主呢？
我們今天常常掛在嘴上的民主其實只是民主的一種類型，也就是那種由百姓選出一群代表議政決策的代議式民主。而馬家輝兄所說的「民主是限權」則隱含了另一重大家對現代政治的理解，亦即行政、立法與司法等三權的各自獨立和相互制衡。由於這一切都已成了常識，因此使得我們很容易對任何其他種類的民主理念都嗤之以鼻，覺得它們都是掛羊頭賣狗肉的假民主，比如說中華人民共和國一度標榜的「人民民主」。
從字面上看，「人民民主」裏的「人民」是多餘的，既有「民主」又何必再加一個「人民」前綴呢？但是在政治思想史的脈絡和政治實踐的經驗裏頭，「人民民主」則是意有所指的。首先，它要在實踐上和蘇聯模式的「無產階級民主」有所區分，強調一種跨階級跨界別包含了全體人民在內的民主政治。其次，「人民民主」就是要和歐美主流的代議式民主對著幹，以避免代議民主走向「資產階級民主」的錯誤道路，而這種思路是有其哲學根源的。
法國大革命的思想導師盧騷就很反對代議民主，他覺得選一幫專業政治人代表全民執政議政根本不足以體現人民的意志，頂多只是「加總式的意志」(will of all)而非更民主的「全體意志」(general will)。後來的馬克思主義傳統也繼承了盧騷的想法，認為人民選出的代表久而久之會淪為一群脫離群眾的專業政客，使得政治成了一幫有錢又有勢的資產階級的玩物，竊取了人民的授權，尋求自己的利益，最後反過來奴役大眾。最明顯的例子莫過於英國前首相貝理雅可以在主流民意反對的情形下斷然出兵伊拉克，和美國政壇習以為常的游說政治使一些有利於大商家的政策得以順利通過。
至於馬家輝兄談到的「限權」和一般常被拿來和民主配套的「三權分立」，我們更應該注意在現代民主政治的實踐史上，它們往往不是民主理念的邏輯結果，而是制約民主的設計。最著名的例子是美國的建國諸父在「費城制憲會議」時的經典論戰，當時有不少人反對「三權分立」的構想，就是因為它限制了人民的權力。所以有代表提出大法官不該是終身制，甚至主張把法院放在議會之下。今天回顧那段為人稱頌的美國建國史，我們不難發現除了民主之外，對「多數暴政」和「過度民主」的恐懼與提防也是它的重要主題。
那麼中華人民共和國有什麼方法可以避免代議民主的弊端？又該怎樣落實「人民民主」的理念呢？舉其大者，「人民代表大會」是也。「全國人大」在體制上是全國最高權力來源，不論行政、立法還是司法，最終都要歸在人大之下。很多人批評這種體制容不下司法獨立的空間，可是贊成它的人則會反駁憑什麼讓非民選的法官凌駕在人民的權力之上呢？再說代表的身分，也有許多人主張人大代表應該專職化，就像西方國家的民意代表一樣。不過人大的原初設計理念正是要反對專職，讓人大開完會之後回到原來的工作崗位，不致脫離群眾蛻變為專業政客。
再回到「文革」的問題，沒人可以輕易否認它出自於毛澤東奪權鬥爭的個人目的，更沒有人能夠否定「十年浩劫」帶來的災難和痛苦。但是單純地在文革和獨裁之間畫上等號，就太過輕視當時受鼓動的百姓的自由意志了。直到今天為止，都還有部分內地「新左派」的學者和外國的激進思想家如巴迪烏(Alain Badiou)以為文革在早期確實是場「真正的革命」、「民主的實驗」。你可以說毛澤東講的「大民主」只是煽動人心的說詞，但是你不能說那些佔領學校的學生和衝進政府單位奪公章的人全都不是「人民民主」的真誠信徒。對不少當時的參與者而言，文革真正是從根本改造人性，徹底打倒官僚體制，達成「沒有黨派也不再有國家機器」之革命理想的「偉大鬥爭」，是「人民民主」這個理念的終極落實。
說了這麼半天，我的意圖絕非是要平反文革的惡名，也不是要替中共的極權體制塗脂抹粉，更不是想為曾蔭權開脫錯誤；恰恰相反，我是要提供一個現代中國官方民主概念的系譜，循此才能看到曾蔭權的真正問題。
首先，我們要注意曾蔭權的言論其實是有所本的。曾有學者專門做過研究，指出自從鄧小平上台執政之後，「人民民主」這個說法出現的頻率就急劇減少了，政府甚至連「民主」二字都不大願談，直到最近幾年才有改變。與此同時，「穩定」和「發展」成了新的關鍵詞，「革命」則逐步讓位予「改革」。鄧小平不喜多言「民主」不是因為他獨裁(不要忘記講民主講得最多的正是大獨裁者毛澤東)，而是因為他把「民主」(更準確地說，是「人民民主」)和文化大革命放在了一起了。其實這也不是他一個人的想法，在很多重新出山的老幹部眼中，文革裏的打砸搶，十年浩劫的種種亂象就是一種最極端的民主，「把權力交給人民」的最可怕結果；簡單地說，暴民政治。
從這個角度上看，曾蔭權甚至相當熟悉國情﹝也有可能是誤打誤撞﹞。問題是一個生長在英國殖民地，曾在哈佛攻讀公共行政的香港